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2Market and Firms
The Changing Competitive Environment
This chapter, using macro data and interview results, discusses the basic competitive
environment of China’s motorcycle industry during the reform period and its changes
after 2000. Section I briefly clarifies the global position of the industry, and in Section
II, the overall supply side profile of the industry is described analyzing mainly market
concentration situation and the size, nature, and profitability of participating firms. In
Section III, market- or demand-side factors such as the size and nature of demand,
distribution system, and governmental supervision system and regulations are exam-
ined.
I. Competition among Indigenous Makers: The Domestic Market and
Its Global Position
The central players in China’s motorcycle industry are indigenous firms, and the
major playing field is the domestic market. The industry expanded rapidly in the first
half of the 1990s, and as early as in 1997 its production rose above 10 million units,
accounting for half of global production in terms of the number of units. In 2003, the
number of motorcycles produced domestically exceeded 14 million units (Figure
2-1).
On the other hand, it was Japanese companies that led the world motorcycle
industry. Some 90 percent of sales and production of motorcycles are concentrated in
Asia in terms of the number of units (Figure 2-2), and the great majority, except in
China, are produced under the brand names of Japan’s four makers. Among them,
Honda is the industry’s dominant firm. For example, as of 2003, the Honda brand
accounted for 38 percent of the 5.6 million motorcycles sold in South Asia and 52
percent of the 6.7 million in the ASEAN market. These motorcycles are supplied
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Fig. 2-1. China’s Motorcycle Production and Export
Sources: ZQGNB (various years.)
Fig. 2-2. Global Motorcycle Production
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locally by Honda-affiliated makers (wholly owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, and
technically supported local makers).1 In the Japanese market, too, an oligopoly among
the four major makers has continued since the 1970s.
Japanese makers have also entered the Chinese market. From the beginning of the
1990s, about twenty foreign-JV firms were established in China, ten of them by the
four major Japanese makers. Their total domestic market share at the end of the 1990s
was approximately 5 percent. Honda’s share dropped to 3.3 percent in 1999 from 11
percent in 1993. It is only in China that the Japanese makers long took second billing
to local makers. This indicates the presence of unique elements in the competitive
world of indigenous firms in China and its development process.
Further, Chinese indigenous makers began to sharply increase their exports from
around 2000. Their destinations are low-income countries in Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East, all markets with a qualitative resemblance to the Chinese market (Figure
2-3).
In China, the motorcycle industry is going through the phases of import  → import
substitution by indigenous makers → export, and on the surface, it appears to be
achieving a “catching-up style development.” And yet, if we delve into the develop-
ment pattern and organization of indigenous makers and suppliers, as will be de-
scribed later, they have not yet reached a “homogenization”2 with their Japanese
counterparts. Furthermore, their major export destinations are not developed coun-
tries. In this, they differ from the electronics industries in the NIEs, which, by attain-
ing the high levels of product and technological requirements of the markets in
developed countries, have implemented an “export-led building of technological ca-
Fig. 2-3. Destinations of China’s Motorcycle Exports
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pability” (Hobday 1995). The industry in China gives the impression that its unique
development is being carried out through the global “low-end market.”
II. Relentless Competition among Numerous Firms
1. Dispersion of Market Shares by Rapidly Expanding but Unstable Makers
After production skyrocketed in the first half of the 1990s, the expansion of the
domestic market fell into stagnation after 1997, and exports came to underpin the
production growth. There were as many as 154 firms involved in the competition in
2003, only counting those officially registered. This number has consistently in-
creased with the exception of 1990 and 1997, when the economy was in stagnation,
and the industry is still enjoying active new entries. As for the market share held by
the top makers, in 1995, the top ten accounted for about 75 percent, and this figure
dropped to below 50 percent in 2000. However, from around 2000, the concentration
began to increase again (Figure 2-4).
It is interesting to compare this with the Japanese experience. After World War II,
the Japanese motorcycle industry developed in an environment of competition to meet
domestic demand, which hit its first peak as early as around 1960. During the high-
growth period that started around 1965, motorcycles began to be substituted by
automobiles in the Japanese consumer market. The industry then cultivated export
markets and as the 1980s began, nearly 70 percent of production was for exports.
During this process, the number of makers, which reached as many as 140 in 1953,
comprised mostly of small-size makers, rapidly decreased to seven ten years later in
1964, with most of the others having withdrawn and some of them having been
Fig. 2-4. Market Share of Top Makers
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consolidated into large makers, and further down to four by the beginning of the
1970s, a situation that continues today.
Considering the rise of domestic demand, followed by stagnation, fierce competi-
tion and the cultivation of overseas markets, China from the mid-1990s to today is
analogous to Japan from the 1950s to the mid-1960s. And yet, during this period, the
number of makers, which was sixty in 1990, actually doubled, with the market
concentration of top makers sharply declining.
This indicates that the leading firms followed different development paths in China
and Japan. In 1965, the nineteenth year from its foundation, Honda produced 1.5
million units domestically, and its production exceeded 2 million units in 1974.
However, in China, in the latter half of the 1990s, nearly twenty years after Jialing
launched production, there was a clear pattern where the top makers, after closing on
an annual production level of 1 million units, lost momentum one after the other
(Figure 2-5). This instability seems to be linked to the rapid expansion impetus of
Chinese firms. Looking at the speed of expansion after the beginning of motorcycle
production, shown in Figure 2-6, leading Chinese makers have expanded more rap-
idly than Honda did. Comparing Jialing, the Grand River Group (China’s largest
maker in volume in 2003 and 2004, hereafter Grand River), and Zongshen, it seems
Fig. 2-5. China’s Main Motorcycle Makers and Their Production Levels
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that, in China, the later the firms are established, the more rapidly they expand.
Looking at the experience of other late-industrializing economies, however, we find
that this is not only because they developed late. Leading indigenous makers in
Taiwan and India, where the motorcycle industry has developed well and where
indigenous makers who introduced basic technology from foreign makers play a
significant role, have taken more time than Honda to expand their mass production
capabilities3 (Figure 2-6). It is only in China that, in the motorcycle industry, an
impetus toward rapid expansion and instability are widely seen in leading indigenous
firms.
2. Multilayer Structure with Firms of Diverse Backgrounds
Though the scale of the Chinese motorcycle industry is gigantic as a whole, there is
a mixture of firms with diverse backgrounds, forming several layers differentiated by
competence and the market segments they target. The ways of competing differ from
one layer to another, making it difficult to discuss the whole of China in a single
framework. At this point, let us look at the way that the numerous makers with diverse
backgrounds were born, while confirming the characteristics of each of the layers.
Fig. 2-6. Production Growth of Selected Asian Motorcycle Makers after Their Launch of Production
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(1) The Large State-Owned Makers That Laid the Foundation of the Industry
It was after the introduction of the reform and opening policy that China’s motor-
cycle industry became established as a modern mass-production based, consumer-
goods industry.4 The central players at this stage were armaments factories that as-
pired to survive by converting themselves to civil-demand-oriented production,
represented by Jialing in Chongqing (its name at the time was National Jialing Ma-
chinery Factory, and it produced shell casings and bullets.)
The government gave these firms preferential permission to introduce foreign
technologies. With the imported technologies and new equipment, they rapidly estab-
lished a new type of mass production system, thus coming to dominate in a single
stroke the motorcycle market, which until that time had been a niche market. Most of
the firms that came to hold top market shares by the first half of the 1990s were large
state-owned makers that had properly introduced foreign technologies in one way of
another.5 Qingqi, too, though not an armaments-related factory, was a large state-
owned firm that attained momentum for development by acquiring licensed technol-
ogy from Suzuki.6
One of the important roles played by these large state-owned makers was to lay the
foundations for a mass-production-type motorcycle industry in China. They intro-
duced manufacturing technology for finished products, engines, and major parts, and
at the same time nurtured parts suppliers. They also cultivated the market and estab-
lished rudimentary nationwide sales networks. The major models of today, such as the
CG125 and C100, which will be described in detail in the next chapter, were mostly
introduced from the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. These makers also trained a
large number of engineers, managers, and sales personnel, and their subsequent
outflow facilitated the massive creation of new firms.
(2) New Entrants: Public and Private Makers
As the 1990s began, new entrants increased and the competition intensified. From
the state-owned sector, medium-to-small state-owned firms that did not belong to the
armaments industry entered the market one after another as fast growing makers. In
addition, non-state-owned makers including collectively owned firms and privately
owned makers, as well as foreign JV makers, entered the industry. The share of
nonstate firms was even greater if parts suppliers are included.7 Since motorcycle
parts can be produced with a relatively small initial investment, even small-scale
collectively owned firms in rural areas and private firms owned by individuals were
able to enter the industry.
To be noted in the latter half of the 1990s is the rise of private firms. As shown by
Table 2-1, in 1995, there was not a single private firm among the top ten makers,
whereas in 2001 they accounted for five of the top ten.8 Zongshen, one of the major
subjects of this study, is a new maker that launched operations in the beginning of the
1990s as a specialized assembler of motorcycle engines, and which started motor-
cycle production in 1996. Zongshen, together with Chongqing Lifan Industry (Group)
Co., Ltd. (hereafter Lifan), and Loncin Industry Group Co., Ltd. (hereafter Loncin),
are called Chongqing’s thee big private makers.
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Unlike the big state-owned makers, many of the private firms were small in scale
when they were founded, and only a few introduced foreign technology on a proper
basis. Technologically, they began by collecting and assembling the parts manufac-
tured by legitimate suppliers to large state-owned makers, and by adding minor
changes, accumulated production and development capabilities. This is a “minor-
change-type” development that makes heavy use of existing external resources, as
will be described in the following chapter. Initially, they were criticized as “copy-
makers,” but some emerged as makers that overwhelmed large state-owned makers in
terms of quality, product line-up, and brand credibility.
The new entrants included many smaller companies. They varied a great deal,
ranging from potential quality makers to those called zapai (odds and sods brand)
makers who were mostly “pick-up assemblers” of existing parts, makers only han-
dling licensed production, makers of fake brand products, and “underground facto-
ries” that were not officially registered. In China, a diversity of firms can exist
concurrently, because the country has market segments on varying levels, and the
absolute scale of each segment is huge.
TABLE 2-1
CHANGE IN THE TOP-TEN MOTORCYCLE MAKERS: SHARE IN PRODUCTION BY UNIT, 1990–2003
(%)
1990 1995 2001 2003
Jialing 22.8 Jialing 14.6 Jialing 6.7 Grand River 6.9
Jianshe 15.7 Jianshe 13.2 Qianjiang 6.3 Qianjiang 6.7
Shanghai 14.5 Qingqi 11.7 Lifan 5.8 Jialing 6.6
Qingqi 8.9 Jincheng 8.4 Loncin 4.9 Lifan 5.6
N. Ek Chor 6.3 Jieda* 6.5 Sundiro Honda 4.8 Loncin 5.6
Yuhe 3.1 Shanghai 5.1 Zongshen 4.7 Sundiro Honda 5.4
Nanfang 2.8 N. Ek Chor 4.5 Qingqi 4.6 Zongshen 5.3
Jincheng 2.4 Nanfang 3.5 Grand River 4.2 Jianshe 5.1
Nanchang 2.2 Chanlin 3.5 Jincheng 3.9 Jincheng 4.8
Weiyang 2.1 Qianjiang 3.5 Jianshe 3.3 Qingqi 4.6
Sources: Figures for 1990 are from ZMGB (various years) and figures for 1995, 2001, and 2003 are
from ZQGNB (various years).
Notes: 1. Makers indicated in boldface are private firms.
2. Chanlin = Changchun Chanlin Group Co., Ltd.; Grand River = Grand River Group Co.
Ltd; Jialing = China Jialing Industrial Co., Ltd.; Jianshe = Jianshe Industrial Group Co.,
Ltd.; Jieda = Jiangsu Jieda Motor Group Ltd; Jincheng = Jincheng Group Co., Ltd.;
Lifan = Chongqing Lifan Industry (Group) Co., Ltd.; Loncin = Loncin Holdings Ltd.; N.
Ek Chor = Luoyang Northern Ek Chor Motorcycle Co., Ltd.; Nanchang = Nanchang
Aircraft Manufacturing Co.; Nanfang = Nangfang Motor Limited Co.; Qianjiang = China
Qianjiang Group Co., Ltd; Qingqi = China Qingqi Group Co., Ltd.; Sundiro Honda =
Sundiro Honda Motorcycle Co.; Shanghai = Shanghai Ek Chor Motorcycle Co., Ltd.;
Weiyang = Shaanxi Weiyang Diesel Engine Factory; Yuhe = Nanjing Yuhe Machinery
Factory; Zongshen = Chongqing Zongshen Motorcycle Group.”
* Jieda used to be a collectively owned firm and was the first non-state-owned motorcycle maker to
enter the top-ten ranking.
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(3) Foreign JV Makers
Foreign makers, until the 1980s, sold their own brand products in the Chinese
market through technological licensing provided chiefly to state-owned makers. In
the 1990s, they entered the market through directly managed joint ventures. In the
beginning, many of the foreign JV makers, capitalizing on their high quality and high
performance, employed a high-grade motorcycle strategy targeting the high-end ur-
ban demand, differentiating their products from those of local makers. They lost the
market, however, as a result of the policy restricting the new ownership of motor-
cycles in urban areas in the middle of the 1990s. From around 2000, the foreign JV
makers began to accelerate the full-fledged development of low-price products for
low-end markets, while increasing transactions with local suppliers.
(4) Three Layers
The diverse groups of makers described above can be roughly divided into the
following three layers according to the grade and price of the products they manufac-
ture, the nature of technologies they use and their business behaviors.
The first layer consists of foreign JV makers, whose products are expensive and of
high quality, but whose market share is small. The second layer consists of leading
indigenous makers, including two sub-groups: large state-owned makers and major
new makers. These firms play the pivotal role in the industry in China. Assuming that
the second layer firms constitute the top dozen or so makers, their market share makes
up 60–70 percent of the entire market. The third layer is made up of the others, many
of which are medium-small makers of various sorts, but it also includes new makers
that have the potential to develop as quality makers as well as those who were leading
makers in the 1970s through the 1980s. The new and old makers are mixed, and act as
a seedbed for competition.
This study focuses its analysis on the competition platform of the second layer.
However, since the end of the 1990s, foreign JV makers have been involved in head-
to-head competition with the second-layer makers, while top makers in the third layer
have been replacing lower-ranking firms in the second layer. The quality difference
among the layers is diminishing year by year.
3. Decline of Profitability in the Late 1990s and Recovery after 2001
The fluctuations experienced by China’s motorcycle industry in the second half of
the 1990s were tremendous. This can be observed from the fact that the production of
large state-owned makers decreased sharply starting in the mid-1990s, while new
private makers gained increasing strength (Table 2-1, Figure 2-5). During the days of
the supply shortage in the first half of the 1990s, the industry at large benefited from
high profits, but this boom was short-lived, continuing for just a few years. Profits
plunged, and after 2000, the entire industry sank deep into the red (Figure 2-7).
It was chiefly large makers that fell into stagnation starting toward the end of the
1990s. Looking at the profit rate of makers by firm size (Figure 2-8), deficits were
posted solely by large-size makers for four consecutive years starting in 1999. This
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Fig. 2-7. Profit and Investment of Chinese Motorcycle Industry
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presumably reflects the unfavorable performance of the large state-owned makers as
described above.9
Investment by the industry as a whole, which declined in the second half of the
1990s as profits plunged, has recovered (Figure 2-7). Large firms invested the largest
amount: scale-wise, with their investment accounting for 52 percent and 68 percent of
the total investment of the industry in 1998 and 2002, respectively (ZQGNB, various
years). Their investment propensity is also high and the investment to sales ratio of
Fig. 2-9. Investment Rate of Makers by Firm Size
Source: Same as Figure 2-8.
Note: Investment rate: ratio of total investment of
categorized makers over their total sales.
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large firms is higher than other firms. Small makers have a low investment propensity
(Figure 2-9). Since 2000, there has been an increase of small makers with low profits
and low investment, and large firms with no profits and large investment (Figure 2-
10).
Judging from the above, it may be that large makers facing stagnation continue
production, while small firms presumably engaged in simple production without
making investments continue to enter the market, which in turn facilitates the continu-
ation of the state of excess supply capacity.
The plunge of profits in the latter half of the 1990s was a result of the buyer’s
market and the falling prices. This can be seen clearly in the sharp decline of the
prices of conventional-type products. According to the firms interviewed by the au-
thor, product prices and profits peaked around l994 and 1995, and those of conven-
tional-type products have continued to plunge since that time (Figure 2-11). The drop
from the end of 1999 was particularly prominent.
As for the industry’s average price per unit (Figure 2-12), real prices dropped
sharply in the first half of the 1990s, and registered a further drop in 2000 and
subsequent years.10 In the early 1990s, when there was a massive increase in produc-
tion, profit levels were high, and price cuts were financed primarily by profits. On the
Fig. 2-11. Retail Price of GL125-Type Motorcycles by Various Makers
Source: Author’s interviews with various makers.
Notes: 1. Prices in this figure are the averages for the
typical models. There are a range of prices
depending on the grade.
2. Wuyang-Honda is Wuyang-Honda Motors
(Guangzhou) Co., Ltd., one of Honda’s JV
firms, which has an official licence to produce
the GL125 model.
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other hand, after 2000, prices declined despite a recovery of the profit rate, suggesting
that some kind of rationalization was underway. During this period, the market share
of the top makers climbed, indicating that makers undertaking rationalization have
survived and prevailed.
III. Market Factors: Demand and Governmental Regulation
The study assumes that the size and nature of China’s domestic market determines the
state of the competition in the motorcycle industry, and that changes in the market are
the most important driving force behind firm upgrading. In this section, market
factors will be examined.
1. The Domestic Market: Huge Low-End Demand with a Closed Upper Exit
China’s motorcycle market marked a dramatic expansion over the five years from
1993 to 1997, when the number of motorcycles owned increased by an estimated 30–
40 million units.11 This implies that a huge market, more than twice the size of the
current Japanese market, emerged in a period of just five years. It can be easily
assumed that absolute enormity of the Chinese domestic market is the most important
factor leading to the uniqueness of the development path of Chinese indigenous firms.
Fig. 2-12. Average Price of Motorcycles and Profits per Unit
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In the background of the rapid expansion impetus and instability of Chinese makers,
as outlined above, we can see this huge market, which allows the simultaneous
existence of as many as ten world-class large makers with production capacities of
more than 1 million units each. Presumably, leading makers in Taiwan and India,
which faced the ceiling of stagnant domestic market expansion in their early stage of
development, primarily pursued the capability to handle quality stabilization and new
product development. On the other hand, it can be assumed that immature makers,
which had not yet fully accumulated mass-production capabilities, lost their control
over order as they tried to reach the highest level of mass production possible. This
point will be discussed again with regard to Jialing and Qingqi in Chapter 5.
The increased demand for motorcycles came from small and medium-sized cities
and rural areas rather than big cities that were home to a large number of wealthy
people. In the latter half of the 1990s, rural areas surpassed urban areas in terms of the
diffusion rate (Figure 2-13). The demand for motorcycles in China came mainly from
the low-income population.
Motorcycles in China have been mainly used for commuting and small business,
namely as “transportation for the masses,” and therefore, price is more important than
performance as long as a certain level of quality is provided.
The immediate reason for the stagnant demand for motorcycles in urban areas was
the strict regulations imposed upon their use.12 In the postwar era, Japanese makers
found a path to further development in highly value-added motorcycles tailored to
enthusiasts, a path that Chinese indigenous makers could not follow given the present
situation.
2. The Preference for “Minor-Change” Versions and Quality Requirements
During the author’s observations in the 1990s, hardly any diversity was seen in
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motorcycles in China’s rural areas and small cities, as the market was fully occupied
by some standard vehicles such as the CG125 and minor-change versions of them. As
described in the next chapter, the CG125 and C100 are extremely good technologi-
cally in terms of adaptability to the market of developing countries, and it is under-
standable that their diffusion was facilitated by the attractiveness of the products per
se. However, why is it that there have been no major-change-version models devel-
oped on their basis, and that minor-change-versions prevail, which are indistinguish-
able on the surface? In this section, based on a rudimentary survey conducted by the
author with regard to the distribution of motorcycles,13 the reasons for the preference
for minor-changes-versions over the original models or major changes is discussed.
(1) The Nature of Farmers and Lack of Information
The argument is sometimes made that “farmers are not comfortable with buying
what is different from what others have. They buy what others are already using. Only
then do they feel at ease.”14 In Shandong Province and Inner Mongolia, farmers
usually buy motorcycles at retail shops in the center city/town of county or township,
based, allegedly, on information gained by word of mouth. Some of the information
on a certain type of vehicle regarding the safety and reliability, appropriate price,
gasoline mileage, repair, and other maintenance, may be best confirmed by the fact
that others are using it without any severe problems. In this sense, it is reasonable that
brand-new models, which are not currently in use, cannot be easily accepted in a short
period of time. However, it may well be that, in the long run, word of mouth leads to
the spread of correct product information.
(2) Low Pricing of Minor-Change Version Vehicles
The biggest attraction of minor-change versions is their low price.15 They tend to be
substantially cheaper than the original models. The prices of minor-change versions
of Jialing and Zongshen models are less than half of those of the originals manufac-
tured by Wuyang-Honda Motors (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd. in the late 1990s (Figure 2-
11).
The low pricing seen with minor-change versions also holds with spare parts: in
addition to genuine parts, parts in various price ranges are distributed at the low end of
the market. An interview at a repair shop in a county city of Kulun, Inner Mongolia,
which is frequently visited by rural users, reveals that the price and quality of different
parts varies a great deal, e.g., a cylinder for a CG125 engine costs 230 yuan for a
genuine part, 85 for a good quality copy, and 55 yuan for a poor quality copy
product.16 Once a minor-change version vehicle is purchased, those cheap compatible
parts can be used.
(3) Easy Repair and Maintenance
For minor-change vehicles, there may be a cycle where the availability of repair
parts at hand increases the convenience to users, leading more people to buy the
vehicle, further encouraging the maker to launch compatible types of vehicles (“net-
work externality effect”). Especially in the first half of the 1990s, when locally
produced motorcycles were not highly trusted, ease of maintenance was presumably
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the major judgment criterion. This is seen as the main reason for farmers “wanting to
ride what others are riding.”
In urban areas, where makers have direct retail shops and official dealers, the
access to genuine parts and other direct services is likely convenient, whereas there
are few users who actually use them.17 This is because there is a large-scale market in
cities dedicated exclusively to after-parts, and for parts and subsidiary materials that
are not important to the safety, performance, or quality of the motorcycle, people
generally either have them repaired in a repair shop unaffiliated with the maker or do
the repairs themselves, using cheap copy parts. However, users with a high level of
awareness are said to purchase genuine parts if they are important (e.g., engine
parts).18
(4) Increasing Minor Differentiation and Distribution Infrastructure
On the other hand, in recent years, some differences have become increasingly
conspicuous among minor-change version vehicles. The author observed a repair
shop in Kulun, where a Loncin-brand CG125-type engine was being repaired. The
malfunction had been caused by damage to a certain part attached to the shaft of the
gear unit. According to the owner of the shop performing the job, the gear unit as a
whole could be loaded onto other makers’ CG125-type engines. However, the particu-
lar part that was damaged could not be substituted by the corresponding part of
another maker’s gear unit, because it had a special shape. That particular part had to
be ordered from Loncin’s parts supply center, located within the motorcycle whole-
sale market in the suburb of Shenyang City, 250 km away from the county. Earlier,
makers had produced identically shaped engines with all constituent parts being the
same size, and repairers and users could combine different maker’s engine parts as
they pleased. However, starting a couple of years before the survey, minor differences
allegedly began to appear among makers, making repairers find things increasingly
“troublesome.”19
At present, genuine parts from most makers are available in the wholesale market
in Shengyang. In the beginning of the 1990s, when the parts market was not yet well
formed, direct purchases from the maker using postal money orders was the only way
to get repair parts. But it took as long as two weeks, and required follow-up phone
calls, because orders were often forgotten. Starting in 1995 and 1996, genuine parts
became available via agencies in the wholesale market. Copy parts began to appear in
the market in around 1994, but they were notorious for their poor quality, and users
were eager to purchase genuine parts. Apparently, it was from around 1998 that the
quality of copy parts became stable and everyone began using them.
Seen from the perspective of final demand, the establishment of the distribution
infrastructure proceeded in parallel with the stabilization of repair parts in the 1990s,
forming toward the end of the 1990s the basis for the competition seen today. Further,
in 2000 and thereafter, the differentiation of individual parts began gradually. How-
ever, major-change version vehicles have yet to be launched. The current phase seems
to be one in which the degree of differentiation is steadily expanding within the scope
of minor-change type development.
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(5) Increasing Requirements for Quality
Most of the consumer demand in the first decade of the twenty-first century seems
to have been for improved quality and performance of existing vehicle models, rather
than major changes or great novelty. Makers, retailers, and repair shops share a
common perception that the biggest concern of the majority of motorcycle purchasers
is endurance and gasoline mileage.
There has been an increase in products returned from consumers to makers due to
malfunctions since the latter half of the 1990s. Earlier, amid the supply shortage,
consumers were satisfied as long as they were able to purchase a motorcycle; if the
vehicle broke down, they simply resigned themselves to somehow repairing it them-
selves. Today, by contrast, they quickly demand a replacement. This is partly a result
of the campaign under which makers are using sanbao (returns, repairs, and replace-
ment free of charge) as part of their sales promotion, and thus is fundamentally driven
by heightened level of user demand for quality and good services. Furthermore, there
has apparently been an increase in new users who are sensitive to “drivability and
comfort,” as evidenced by good acceleration, and low vibration and noise.
It may be true that there still is persistent demand for vehicles that are merely good
for “riding” and “moving with loads on,” but quality has taken on primary importance
of late against the backdrop of growing consumer awareness and improved living
standards throughout China.
3. Incomplete Government Regulations and Recent Tightening
The motorcycle, as a product that has an inherent impact upon safety and the
environment, is subject to various public regulations. Emission controls in particular
are becoming increasingly strict worldwide, and have become one of the driving
forces facilitating technological progress on the part of makers who are required to
meet regulations. Also strongly required, in recent years, has been the safeguarding of
intellectual property rights.
Until the 1990s, however, China had extremely loose government regulations cov-
ering those areas both in terms of content and enforcement. This was the primary
factor that allowed the flooding of low-quality and low-price products. In this respect,
too, changes are being steadily made, clearly bringing about favorable results in
recent years.
(1) Immature Government Supervision of the Industry
The Chinese government recognizes that there were major problems and limita-
tions with its industry supervision system until the 1990s.20
The primary purpose of the government’s supervision over the industry in the
1980s was specifically to “prevent a reckless expansion, restrict the market entry of
poor products, and improve quality” (ZMGB 1995, p. 231). Some of the central
measures the government could take to this end included restricting new entrants into
the market, establishing reference standards for technologies and quality, and provid-
ing guidance to new entrants.
However, as the motorcycle industry, unlike the automobile industry, was “outside
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of planning from the beginning,” the government was not armed with effective control
measures.21 In addition, the industry’s production volume was small in the 1980s, and
even if there were problems, the users were individuals whose voices were not so-
cially influential. As such, the government had little motivation to actively control the
industry.
In 1987, the first specialized governmental division in charge of the industry was
established, followed by the introduction of a “list management (mulu guanli) sys-
tem” the following year. Under this system, a new model of vehicle developed by a
maker, after going through safety and environmental impact inspections, is registered
on a “list” compiled by the government (Bureau of Machinery Industry and Ministry
of Public Security), and only after this is the maker qualified to produce the model.
In reality, however, the system did not function effectively. The vehicles actually
produced were often different from the samples submitted for registration to the list.
The screening process differed from one area to another, and there was an absence of
discipline. The interviews the author conducted with makers toward the end of the
1990s revealed that sample vehicles were not necessarily actually inspected, and in
fact were quite easily placed on the list simply through the submission of forms with
vehicle photos attached. In smaller cities and rural areas, vehicle models not regis-
tered on the list (i.e., which presumably failed to meet the official requirements) were
openly used without license plates (number plates) issued by the local public security
office.22 Even in areas with frequent problems, lead administration officials of the
central government were unable to conduct on-site inspections as they wished, be-
cause of the protectionism of provincial governments. The judiciary system was
immature and legal regulations were far from effective.23
As a whole, the ability of public authorities, including the police and system of
justice, to supervise the production of the “non-planned sector” such as motorcycles
and the consumption of ordinary people is immature. It should be regarded as a
problem specific to a developing country and transition economy, which is in the
process of establishing a new system for the entire society to ensure fair competition
and consumer protection, after the economic management method of the time of
planned economy became obsolete, giving way to the preeminence of the market.
Industry supervision has been changing since 2000. The “list management system”
was abolished and replaced in 2001 by an “entry permission (zhunru) system,” a
production licensing system based on the audits of makers themselves. The China
Compulsory Certification (3C) system was introduced into the country’s manufactur-
ing sector, requiring quality audits prior to the launch of products on the market.
Motorcycles were one of the first areas targeted by the system.
(2) Supervision Based on Technological Standards and the Law: Safety and
the Environment
One of the important changes in supervision of the industry was the shift from
“administrative control” in the 1990s to “legal control” and “technological control.”
In the 1980s, industrial supervision, not only for the motorcycle industry but else-
where, relied exclusively upon administrative directives. On the other hand, serious
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efforts were made toward upgrading quality and production efficiency, as Industrial
Standards were established and promulgated, starting in the 1990s.24 In the area of
motorcycles, National Standards (Guojia Biaozhun: GB) began to be introduced in
1984, coupled by Professional Standards for the Automotive Industry (Qiche Hangye
Biaozhun: QC) from 1993.25 The enhancement and promulgation of Industrial Stan-
dards appears to have contributed to technological diffusion in the entire industry and
the upgrading of production efficiency.
To be registered on the production list, new models are required to satisfy compul-
sory GB safety and environmental standards. However, as described above, the list
management itself failed to function effectively, and products failing to comply with
GB standards were placed on the market without any impediments. Standards, though
compulsory, had in fact only limited enforcement power, as they were not legally
enforceable. On the other hand, under pressure to reach international technology
standards in preparation for joining the WTO, the country moved to legislate laws
concerning safety and the environment from 1996, and in 2000 fifteen laws were
promulgated (QGSBW 2001, pp. 982–83).
The level of China’s regulatory standards is by no means low. In the area of
emissions control, in August 2002 the country promulgated new standards that were
compliant with EURO I,26 and will reportedly introduce stricter emissions regulations
comparable with the European counterpart in 2006.27
Environmental regulations do have an important impact upon product development
by makers. In the 1990s, the dominant engines in China shifted from two- to four-
stroke engines. This was partly due to the fact that Honda’s four-stroke engines, such
as the CG125 and GY6, attracted users because of their gasoline mileage. More
fundamentally, however, the projection that stricter emissions controls would make
the existing two-stroke technology unusable encouraged makers to adopt four-stroke
engines.28
What is important for this study is the fact that stricter emissions controls created
the necessity for efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated engines (and other
related critical parts), and this seems to have led to the betterment of the product
development process and a change of the supplier system in recent years (to be
described in Chapter 6).
(3) Neglect of Intellectual Property Rights and Recent Changes
Another key factor that allowed “assembled by pick-up parts” vehicles, which are
really nothing more than copies, to flood into the market was the failure to establish
the protection of intellectual property rights.
From the 1980s, what we call “copy” motorcycles became a target of government
regulations as “faulty and fake” (jiamao-weilie) products. However, the regulation
was primarily intended to protect state-owned firms and consumers from the reckless
behavior of smaller firms, and it was only in the latter half of the 1990s, when China’s
affiliation with the WTO came onto the political agenda and foreign firms made a
flurry of complaints, that it became seen as a universal issue directly linked to the
protection of the rights of the developed countries, namely, as a violation of intellec-
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tual property rights. Under the list management system, the monitoring of intellectual
property rights was looser than that under safety/environment-related standards,29 and
vast quantities of products that were in reality no more than dead copies were in-
cluded in the government’s list, and thus were considered legitimate. The awareness
that they were violating intellectual property rights was indeed lacking in China’s
motorcycle industry in the latter half of the 1990s.
However in recent years, as in the case with the safety and environmental regula-
tions, improvements have been observed on the issue of intellectual property right.
For example, when Yamaha was preparing to accuse a firm of violating its trademark
right in 2002, it sent staff to the violating factory to obtain hard evidence. However,
the staff was detained by the local police and the case nearly swept under the carpet by
powerful provincial protectionism. Yamaha, however, launched lobbying activities to
the central government, while appealing to the media in China and abroad, and it
successfully identified and charged the violating factory. This triggered a strengthen-
ing of the regulations by the government, and the number of fake bikes with falsified
trademarks sharply decreased in 2002 and onwards. The Chinese government, which
was preparing to join the WTO, seems to have taken the incident seriously and used
extraordinarily means to defend its external image. The problems do still remain
serious, but this should be seen as an indication of gradual improvement.
IV. Summary
In this chapter, I have discussed the demand and the market competition environment
that lies in the background of the supplier system as well as the product development
activities of makers and changes within this environment.
The motorcycle industry in China in the 1990s can be characterized as follows.
Disorderly competition was in place, driven by a massive number of users with poor
consumer consciousness willing to purchase low-quality products as long as they
were inexpensive, and the enthusiastic spirit of firms producing in large volumes
whatever was sellable, coupled by slack governmental regulations. In this process,
existing large state-owned makers lost their momentum, while new private makers,
which were capable of quickly supplying low-price products, came to play the central
role, partially in the latter half of the 1990s.
However, as the living standard improved and a state of “excess supply” became
general, consumers’ demands for quality heightened and at the same time government
regulations concerning safety and the environment as well as intellectual property
rights have been strengthened. The top makers are increasing their share in a situation
of continuing price declines and a bottoming out of the industry’s profits, apparently
indicating that firms capable of responding to the new changes in demand are increas-
ingly exerting their strength.
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Notes
1 Interview with Honda Motor Co., Ltd. on July 6, 2004.
2 The essence of the flying-geese model of economic development (catching-up style devel-
opment model) is that the industrial structure, firms, and demand of latecomers reaches a
“homogenization” with those of the developed countries. See Akamatsu (1962), Suehiro
(2000), and Yun (2003).
3 In addition to China, indigenous firms in Taiwan and India are highly competitive. In
Taiwan, the three top makers have a 90 percent or greater share of production. Of the three,
two are indigenous makers. However, in their development process, the technological
support provided by Honda played a vital role. In India, too, indigenous makers enjoy a
high market share, whereas Japanese makers increased their share when open competition
was phased in during the 1990s; in 2003, a joint venture maker with Honda captured a 40
percent share. For the motorcycle industry in Taiwan, see CCYAH (1998), Sato (1999),
Shih and Chen (2004), and Ohara (2005), and for India, see INTECOS and CIER (2001)
and Shimane (2005).
4 The production of motorcycles for the military, police, and postal services began in the
1950s, but the number of makers as well as the size of production was very limited (ZMGB
1995, p. 295).
5 Thirteen state-owned makers officially entered into agreements with foreign makers for the
introduction of technology, technical cooperation, and the procurement of core parts in the
1980s; six were in the armaments industry (QGSBW 2001, pp. 9–12).
6 Qingqi, which began making imitations of small East European mopeds in the 1950s in
Jinan City, Shandong Province, is one of China’s most traditional motorcycle makers. Its
name at the time was Jianan General Light Motorcycle Manufactory.
7 According to the 1995 National Industrial Census, of all motorcycle parts (value of indus-
trial output by “all township and higher level self-supported enterprises”), 12% were
manufactured by state-owned firms, 34% by collectively owned firms, 17% by foreign JV
firms, and the remaining 37% by others (presumably mostly privately owned firms). (Cal-
culated based on the relevant pages of DQGPB [1997]).
8 Sundiro Honda Motorcycle Co., Ltd., one of the five private firms, was a joint venture
established in 2001 mainly by Honda and Hainan Sundiro Motorcycle Co., Ltd., a core
subsidiary firm of the Sundiro Group (hereafter Sundiro), a privately owned firm estab-
lished in 1988. Prior to the joint venture, Sundiro was producing 550,000 units, and the
majority of the JV’s share as of 2001 was taken over from this.
9 Presumably, the stagnation hit some of the former large state-owned firms most seriously.
The profits of the major makers were not disclosed for a long period of time, but in its 2004
edition, Zhongguo qiche gongye nianjian [China automotive industry yearbook], for the
first time in several years, the profits of the major motorcycle makers (fifteen firms) were
disclosed. According to this, Jialing, Qingqi, Jianshe Industrial Group Co., Ltd., and Nanfang
Motor Limited Company were in the red. Among them, Jialing moved into the black in
2003 (ZQGNB 2004 edition, p. 353).
10 The numbers reflect a drop in the unit price of individual models, mixed with the effect of
an average price increase resulting from an upgrading of the composition of models. In the
1990s, the market composition of types of motorcycles dramatically changed, from small
to large types and from two-stroke to four-stroke engine types. In addition, each maker
released new models. This inherently had the effect of raising unit prices, and yet unit
prices have declined since 2000.
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11 Shen, It$o, and Li (2002) estimate that the number of the motorcycles owned in China
increased to as many as 52 million in 2000. In Japan, about 13 million motorcycles were in
use in 2003.
12 Restrictions were implemented in 128 large and medium-sized cities in 2002 (ZQGNB
2003 edition, p. 358).
13 The author conducted interviews in October 2002 in Jinan City, Shandong Province and in
Kulun County, Tongliao City, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region with fifteen business
units including wholesalers, retailers (maker’s direct retail shops, official dealer’s shops,
and independent small retailers), after-parts shops, and repair shops.
14 According to an interview with a wholesaler in the wholesale market dealing exclusively in
motorcycles in the suburbs of Jinan City (October 28, 2002). In Shandong Province, there
are seven or eight large wholesale markets, where wholesalers and retailers from nearby
county towns come to make purchases. Through them, motorcycles are sold to small cities
and farming villages. This wholesale market was established around 1994.
15 All the interviewees are in agreement on this point.
16 Interview conducted on October 30, 2002. If ten other types of parts are divided into (1)
genuine parts, (2) good quality copies, and (3) poor quality copies, the price of (1) ranges
1.8–4 and that of (3) from 0.4–0.6 vis-à-vis (2) = 1.
17 Interviews with a direct retail shop of Qingqi and an official retail dealer of Sundiro in Jinan
City (October 27). Sales of after parts, repair and other services accounted for only 5
percent and 1 percent of their total sales, respectively.
18 Same interview as Note 17. The same response was received from a repair shop in Kulun
County.
19 Same interview with a repair shop in Kulun County.
20 The statements that follow are based on the author’s interview with the Automobile Busi-
ness Management Division, Industrial Business Management Department, Bureau of Ma-
chinery Industry, which was the administrative division in charge of supervising the motor-
cycle industry at the time (January 14, 1999).
21 Supervision over the industry (more properly, control at the time) by the government in the
1980s was implemented basically by administrative plans and directives. One of the main
sources of authority for the directives was the right to distribute important resources to
firms. The automobile industry, which relied heavily upon the government for production
resources and sales, could be controlled with ease. In contrast, there was much less need for
the motorcycle industry to rely upon the central government either for industrial materials,
as they could be acquired, or for sales channels because its users were individuals. A similar
case is examined by Marukawa (1999) with regard to the expansion of the management
autonomy of TV firms in the beginning of the 1990s.
22 When a newly purchased motorcycle is registered with the local public security office, the
security official checks and confirms that the model of the vehicle is included on the list and
issues a license plate. However, in rural areas and small cities, it was a common practice for
users to avoid paying tax and registration fees, using their motorcycles without registration.
23 An officer in charge described this as “a problem of the society as a whole that cannot be
solved simply by the department in charge.”
24 In 1988, the Standardization Law of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated and
the regulations for the implementation of the law were issued in 1990.
25 The Industrial Standards include compulsory standards for safety, environment, and energy
saving (GB only) and voluntary standards for quality upgrading, rationalization and efficiency
(GB and QC). As of 2000, 26 standards on environment and safety, 131 standards on
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technology, and 30 standards on quality were established (QGSBW 2001, pp. 971–73).
26 Wang and Liu (2001, p. 109). EURO I is an emission regulation standard determined by the
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) which was implemented in Europe from 1999.
27 It is reported that Europe introduced EURO II in 2003 and will introduce EURO III in 2006
(ZQGNB 2003 edition, p. 358).
28 In the first half of the 1990s, the shift to four-stroke engine was taken for granted in the
industry due to the strengthening of environmental regulations. In fact, no two-stroke
technology was introduced from abroad in the 1990s (ZMGB 1995, pp. 295–96). Two-
stroke engines have the following advantages: (1) simple intake and exhaust mechanism,
fewer parts, and easy production and repair, and (2) strong torque and good drivability. On
the other hand, four-stroke engines, with their excellent combustion efficiency, have the
following advantages: (1) good gasoline mileage, leading to lower gasoline costs; and (2)
cleaner emissions.
29 The Bureau of Machinery Industry determined, according to the above interview with the
Bureau, that a vehicle is not a fake “if there was a 5 percent difference as a whole when
comparing various parameters with the existing product.” Not much importance was at-
tached to intellectual property rights in the list management.
